The argument about a private language by Ludwig Wittgenstein
in correlation with the philosophy of language by Donald Davidson

by Bettina Müller

The argument about a private language by Wittgenstein
examines the thesis, that a private language is
impossible to exist. Wittgenstein states, that a
private language is only accessible for the speaker
himself, who is the only one to understand the
individual references of his conversing.

Sentence 202

"Therefore is >following the rule< the code of
practise. And to follow the rule believing is not: to
follow the rule. Therefore it is impossible to follow
the rule privatim, because otherwise it would be the
same to follow the rule believing as to follow the
rule."

The position of Wittgenstein becomes apparent in the
sentence 504 that considers the communicative
situation:

"But when someone states:" How shall I understand,
what he means, I can only see his characters", I say:"
How can he understand, what he means, as he can only
use his characters."

The thesis, that Wittgenstein states shall be executed
by means of the subject matter of communication. The
communicative aspect shall be elucidated by the
philosophy of Donald Davidson, and I want to deepen
the philosophy of Davidson with Saul Kike furthermore.

At this juncture the issue of the argument of the
private language is traced back to the examination of
language by Kripke.

Important tracts of the philosophy of language by
Davidson for example the accurateness of translation,
that abuts to the radical translation by Quine, the
principle of forbearance, that ascribes something
intelligent and true as the basis of communication and
the topic of the schema of notion, that interlaces
language and the ownership of a schema of notion and
poses questions about the translatability of private
languages, shall here be applied to Wittgenstein's
issue about the private language, respectively the
following of rules.

The schema of Notion:

One thesis of D. Davidson would be, that the
translations from one language into another are
basically possible and indeed in such a manner, that
no context would be to extrinsic, to make this
impossible. One possibility would be now, that a
translation from one schema into another is
impossible, as e.g. convictions, hopes, cognitions
have no true correspondents.

You can formulate easily in one language, but not in
another.

" Even reality would be schema relative: What is
defined as true in one system, is not necessarily
perceived as true in any other."

The native American language is here referred to as an
example. Do languages exist that are e.g.
untranslatable, that languages really cannot
correspond with each other? Hopi owns a metaphysic,
being that extrinsic in correlation with the English
language, that Hopi and English do not correspond at
all.

"Whorf, who wants to prove, that Hopi owns a
metaphysic, that is so alien to us, that Hopi and
English cannot correlate >made adjustable< (as he
formulates), uses the English language to transmit the
content of Hopi sample sentences." Davidson's goal
would finally be the Principle of Charity for the
inducing of understanding.

"Due to the precondition of the underlying methodology
of interpretation, we are unable to judge, others
would have terms and beliefs, that are entirely
different from our own."

The Principle of Charity:

The Principle of Charity connotates, that one presumes
the speaker to have good and true reasons, and as
well, that one is lenient towards the interpretation
of the spoken and that the understanding of the other
therefore needs a theory of believing. Language would
be full of mistakes, states Davidson, it would be the
special task of the philosopher to forbear and to make
an understanding possible. A well known example by
Davidson for this thesis is, that a ship passes by and
one speaker states "look, what a beautiful yawl",
while it is a ketsch but inspite the recipient
understands him inspite. This forbearance, emphasises
Davidson, would not be a mistake of his philosophy,
but an important part of it. The understanding of
another would be finally the conterminous task of
linguists, psychologists and philosophers.

To clarify, what the impact of the said is, Davidson
elucidates a theory of belief, that he explains by use
of a spieltheorie >game theory<. As stated, to
understand a speaker, one has to consider the (his
very own) manner and context of speaking. A speaker
believes a sentences to be true in a specific
situation, and the interpreter has to know the
significance and the significance can only be known by
the interpreter, when he knows, what the speaker
believes in with his utterance.

Davidson talks about a compass. A possibility to brake
out would be, to find proves for what the words mean,
independently from any believes of a speaker. This
documentation would have to be independent from
intentions, desires, feels of compunction, wishes,
utterances of acceptance and conventions. Because
those contain all components of belief.

A reversed method would be, to design a theory, that
deduces exact information about the intentions, wishes
and convictions of a speaker. This would mean to
define or explain delimitations of a language on the
basis of no delimitations of language intentions,
usage, purposes, functions and the like. Davidson
designates here Mead. Dewey, Wittgenstein and Grice.

One cannot interpret any linguistic activity, without
knowing, what the speaker believes, states Davidson.
He suggests, that one has to find a complete new
approach of dealing with any interpretation of any
utterances by using a theory of belief and the theory
of meaning; this in correlation with the radical
translation. The problem is again formulated in such a
manner, that the understanding of all meaning,
believes, convictions and intentions would be crucial
for any understanding of the speaker.

Not to know, what the speaker believes, Davidson
substitutes this problem with the theory of decision.
It shall not matter to a person, whether you offer
5000 $ or a game. The game is defined that the person
can receive 11$, when the coin shows the number or no
$, when the coin shows the emblem. This game can be
explained in such a manner, that it is meaningless and
unimportant on the subjective scale of values of that
person, to gain or loose money on that niveau.

"We can explain (i.e. interpret) the indifference of
the person, by stating the assumption, money would
have declining marginal utilities for the person: 5$
would be positioned between 0$ and 11$ on a subjective
scale of values. (Page 210)

The value of the game derives from the values of the
results.

"The value of the game is the sum of the values of
possible results, constricted by its  verisimilitude."
(Page 210)

Here, the question comes up, as 5$ is not the middle
between 0$ and 11$, what happens within the player,
concerning the evaluation of the verisimilitude of
number or emblem. One postulates, that number and
emblem are equally probable. As the benefit of 5$ not
being positioned exactly in the middle of 0$ and 11$,
the player should actually think, that emblem -
meaning 0$ - would occur more often. Would he consider
the chances equally possible, he would have accepted
the game.

Summarized the issue here is the alternative decision
and two psychological factors. The values that the
decision maker ascribes to the result and the chance
that he ascribes to this result, depending on his
decision.

The correlation with language, with communication
becomes apparent. Neither the convictions, nor the
values of the decision can be filtered, when one only
has the choice as a decision, between playing and not
playing.

"Are the convictions of the player (thus the by
himself adopted subjective chances) given, it is easy,
to calculate his relative values depending on his
choice, are his values given, we can deduce his
convictions. But how can we deduce both, his believes
and his values, when only his choices are given?"

Saul Kripke

Indispensable for the adaptation of the argument of
the private language is the altercation with Saul
Kripke. Not only "Wittgenstein - About Rules and
Private Language" shall be processed here, but as well
"Name and Necessity", a text by Kripke, that deals
with the issue of name-theory and is linked to the
philosophy of Searles, and it can be correlated to the
argument about the possibility of a private language
insofar, as it handles the issue of language likewise
including the question about a possible private
language. Thus language is illuminated further and
common linguistic behaviour is analysed to the point,
respectively deconstructed.

Wittgenstein About Rules and Private Language
concerning the Sceptic:

Kripke classifies the argument about private language
of the philosophical examination as a special case of
further reflections about language.

The logical content of language is a much discussed
matter of course for representatives of language
philosophy. Kripke now deliberately introduces the
addition. Used to have administrated finite additions,
the rule however constitutes now the answers to
arbitrary many arithmetic problems.

Kripke now introduces an eccentric sceptic, that mixes
up the parlance of addition and the quaddition
(explained in the following paragraph) or: critically
highlights.

68 plus 57 should actually make 125, but Kripke or the
sceptic redefine the addition and state, from a
certain worth 57 on, the answer would be 5.

Addition: 68 + 57 = 125

Quaddition: 68 * 57 = 5 - this according to
definition: x * y = 5, x, y > 57

This use of language, so the sceptic, be now that way,
that I wrongly interpreted my former use of language.
He now makes use of the means of LSD or a fit of
raving madness (!), leading to the misinterpretation
of the former usage.

Notion is therefore that one, that one has an
imagination, e.g. a quaddition would be the meant and
therefore something, e.g. by the means of a fit the
former use of language would have been changed.
Likewise there is other examples for the former and
current use of language. For example the word "green".
When I imagine "green" I call into my consciousness,
how I use the word. But maybe I meant with the "green"
in the past actually "glee".

"Maybe I meant with "green" glee in the past, and I
should be induced constantly to use the word "green"
to describe the in reality glee colour-imagination on
glee objects. (Page 32)

The sceptic, which Kripke describes here is really
sceptic though and through "sceptic". Rules that
enforce a "5" or "125"as and answer or justify them,
are questioned. He states a hypothesis that changes
the use of language. The term "plus" or "green", that
one used in the past, was in reality the mentioned
"quus" (or "glee"). Former ways using language shall
be questioned here, if not one would not do the
problem justice. Likewise the skeptic does not accept
behaviorist restrictions.

Name and Necessity:

Further aspects of language with the emphasis on the
name can be found in Kripke's Name and necessity.
While not referring to the theory, that a name leads
to a necessity. As always common to show intelligence,
by deducing identity from the name, Kripke proves,
that this approach is wrong in itself. Kripke chooses
"Dartmouth" as an example.

"When we use the name "Dartmouth" to describe a
certain locality in England, then it can be possible,
that the locality is called that way, as it is
positioned at the orifice of the Dart. But, states
Mill, even if the course of the Dart (the Dart is a
river) would change, so that Dartmouth would not be
localized at the orifice of the Dart, we could still
call the city accurately "Dartmouth", even if the name
could suggest, that the city would be localized at the
orifice of the river Dart. (Name and Necessity page
35)

Kripke pursues the name theory and language, by the
use of explaining terms like diverse worlds, rigid
definitions, contrafactic situations and struggles
against John Searle's bundle theory to explain names.

According to Searle, to identify a name or an object
one needs a series of identifying descriptions or to
speak with Kripke's interpretation of Searle: thus it
would be according to Searle not a neckwear, but
contingent truth, that Aristoteles worked as an
educator. But Kripke proceeds further and denies any
necessity that Aristoleles would have needed to have
this characteristic that he is commonly accredited
with. kripke tries to demonstrate in his book Name and
Necessity that names are fix phrases of description.

As his first argument for his thesis he introduces
historical science. In historical science there would
be some opinions, that as soon as an individual is
born, it would be destined to fulfil certain tasks.
When necessary truth can be found or are defined in
correlation with a person, one lapses into a
deterministic worldview.

"..., that a given individual, as soon as being born,
is predefined to fulfil various big tasks, and
therefore it will instantaneous belong to the nature
of the being Artistoteles, to develop thoughts, that
had an incredible impact on the western world."
Kripke, Name and Necessity

For Kripke as well, the most important characteristics
of Aristoteles can be found in his philosophical work
and the most important characteristics of Hitler can
be found in his murderous political role, but
nevertheless, no fate did determine their lives, they
could have decided to behave differently at any given
time.

"When I hear the name "Hitler", then I have indeed a
deluding "feeling in my stomach", that it is somehow
analytic, that this person was evil. But in reality it
is probably not analytic. Hitler could have spent his
whole life in peace in Linz. (Page 89)

A little bit more noncommittal does Kripke see his
argumentation concerning language. One could indeed
imagine a contra factive situation, where people in
other worlds speak a different language, but
nevertheless, and here he seems to follow the
arguments of the language- and omission-philosopher
Donald Davidson, even if one would use language in a
no common way, one would use exactly the very
language, including all it's meanings and references,
that it normally contains, to describe this uncommon
use.

"But we still use the German, with the descriptions
and references, that it represents for us, for a
description of this world" (page 92)

Back to the above mentioned terms.

Contra facticity or a contra factive situation is a
situation, which never exists like that, but that
would have been imaginable, e.g., that Hitler just
stayed in Linz and never gained any powers.

A validation in various worlds means, that one for
example states, one can imagine a possible world, in
which Aristoteles did not write his oeuvre, but
nevertheless the name Aristoteles is valid in this
other world. Kripke wants to prove, that names are
rigid terms of denominations.

One ca e.g. refers to the term " one meter" as a rigid
term of denomination. As generally known, metal e.g.
lolls itself. Therefore a possible world is
imaginable, in which a bar of one meter is longer or
shorter then a meter - and nevertheless the rigid term
"one meter" exists.

This considerations seem to me appealing for the
argument of the private language, as specially in e.g.
contra factic situations private languages can
originate, names, that are part of the private
language, proves Kripke to be that rigid, that even if
they would be changed in the use of a private
linguistic manner, they would still mark the object,
that was referred to.

Research:

There is various literature existing about the
argument of the private language by Wittgenstein, one
of the outstanding philosophers in the German
perception concerning my topic appear to be Michael
Esfeld, who teaches in Switzerland. I want to
recapitulate some of his essays here. Michael Esfeld -
20 years of following rules after Kripkes'
Wittgenstein.

A very important contribution to the discussion of
Kripkes' Wittgenstein delivers Michael Esfelds' essay
- following rules 20 years after Kripkes'
Wittgenstein. As the title of the essay alludes,
Esfeld is dealing with the topic of following rules
and he centralizes important arguments of the
discussion. Important is hereby the following thought:

"Concerning all mental - as mental ideas or
representations - and all natural - like dispositions
concerning a certain behaviour - nothing, that would
over lead to anything beyond itself or would determine
anything beyond itself, what a correct use of a
certain term in a new situation would be. The reason
is, that all natural and all mental can only conduct
our thinking, when it is interpreted as a certain rule
of meaning. Each mental and natural candidate for
something, that shall represent the meaning of our
convictions, is nothing but finite and can therefore
accommodated with infinite many logically possible
rules of meaning. (...)

The problem of following rules is therefore the
question how we can follow and therefore constructing
of convictions certain meaningful rules."

The problem of following rules can be divided into two
different aspects, the infinite aspect and the
normative aspect. The infinite asks for the sceptical
challenge after Kripke. Infinite possibilities, to
formulate things exist and still all these
possibilities coincide with the one possibility.

"Each of this ways concurs with the rule, that
instantiates the finite, under an interpretation of
that, that this rule states."

The normative aspect asks, what defines, which is the
correct way, to use a term in a new situation.

"What defines, which is the correct way, to use a term
in a new situation, so that the respective person
follows a rule in sense of, that a diversion between
correct and incorrect following of rules is at it's
disposal?"

Direct and indirect solution of the following of rules

There are two possibilities, being a solution of the
problem of following rules, the direct solution and
the sceptic solution. Direct and sceptic solution
explains themselves by the means of the respectively
other justification. The direct solution provides the
following: there are conditions of truth for
statements that ascribe convictions with a defined
meaning to persons.

"Conditions of truth are to be understood as truth
makers in sense of: independently, whether a person is
ascribed of a conviction with a certain meaning,
exists a fact, that makes such an ascription true."

The sceptical solution contradicts that:

"A sceptical solution denies, that there is any
conditions of truth existing for such ascriptions.
Merely conditions of allegations are accepted. It is
exactly then allegeable, that a person owns a
conviction with a precise meaning, when this person is
participating in a social, linguistic praxis, where
the person is treated by other persons, that it has
convictions of the respective types."

No criteria of the use of term exist for a community.
The factual use is the correct use. This involves,
that the sceptical solution does not endorse the step
from the condition of predication to the condition of
truth.

"The sceptical solution does not endorse the step from
the from the condition of predication to the condition
of truth, because no criteria of the use of terms
exists in the community.

By the means of the factice use is defined, what I
counts as the correct use."

Pragmatic solution of following rules:

A further form would be the pragmatic solution. It
constitutes a betwixt form of pragmatic and sceptical
solution. Unlike a sceptical solution the pragmatic
solution acknowledges conditions of truth for the
ascription of convictions.

The direct, sceptical, pragmatic solution in the
context of the aspect of infinity and normatively

These three solutions can be understood better in
connection with the aspect of infinity and normatively
or at least can be furthermore differentiated:

- The direct solution refers instantaneously to the
aspect of infinity. The infinite many possibilities
are that much restricted, that the determinateness of
meaning of out conviction could be reconstructed. 

" A direct solution instantaneously refers to the
infinitive-aspect. It tries, to show something, that
restricts the infinite variety of logically possible
meanings in so far, that the assertiveness of meaning
of a conviction can be reconstructed. When this
evidence succeeds, then something exists, that defines
the semantically correct use of a term for infinite
many new situations. "

- The sceptical solution denies that. Normativity
exclusively applies to the accordance between
individual and community.

"A sceptical solution assumes that something like that
does not exist at all. Hence it is concluded, that no
rational or normative criteria for the future use of a
term exist; the normativity applies only to the
concordance between individual and community."

- A pragmatic solution affixes with the aspect of
normativity. At this juncture is the central aspect of
sanctions. Affirmations or rejections regulate the
correct use.

"Sanctions in sense of affirmations or rejections of
certain ways of acting shall provide a person with a
criterion [135] of diversion between what a person
itself defines as correct and what is correct in the
eyes of the others. Sanctions shall restrict the
elbowroom of the involved persons of possible meaning:
they shall arbitrate the involved persons a practical
knowledge, which enables them, to follow a rule
without interpretation, and which defines, what the
correct use of a term in infinite new situations is."

text written and copyright Bettina Müller 2006

translation and translation copyright by Sibyll Kalff 2007